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journa l home page : www.e l sev ier .com/ loca te /endeIn the fourth volume of the Encyclopédie, ou dictionnaire
raisonné des sciences, des métiers et des arts (1751–1772), the
French mathematician and philosophe Jean d’Alembert, coeditor
of this monument to Enlightenment, offered a pithy deﬁnition of
the French word diagramme: “It is a ﬁgure or a construction of lines
intended to explain or demonstrate a proposition. See Figure.” This
eighteenth-century understanding of a geometric diagram reﬂects
a long, tangled history of a concept. As d’Alembert observed,
“This word is more often used in Latin, diagramma, than in
French. One simply uses the word ﬁgure.” The same volume
contained Rousseau’s remarks on diagram as a term of art in
ancient music to describe “scale, range, or system.”1 Both
deﬁnitions invoked a word of great antiquity that performed
more than one function.
Diagramming is an iconic expression of the human ability to
reduce key concepts to their essential visual expression. Diagrams
are pervasive in the discovery, development, and communication
of scientiﬁc and mathematical ideas and technological systems.
They abstract physically complex entities; they outline certain
features at the expense of others to focus our attention on speciﬁc* Corresponding author.
E-mail address: greg@gregpriest.com (G. Priest).
1 Jean d’Alembert, “Diagramme,” in Encyclopédie, ou dictionnaire raisonné des
sciences, des métiers et des arts, vol. 4, ed. Denis Diderot and Jean d’Alembert (Paris,
1751–1772), 933. We thank John Bender and Michael Marrinan, The Culture of
Diagram (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2010),10, for bringing this entry to our
attention.
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0160-9327/© 2018 Published by Elsevier Ltd.operations; they make visible what might otherwise be invisible.
In The Life of Sir Isaac Newton (1831) David Brewster spoke
admiringly of “a remarkable diagram relative to the solar system”
inscribed on scroll adorning Newton’s 1731 tomb in Westminster
Abbey (Figure 1).2 It is telling that at the end of Newton’s
celebrated life as the most famous mathematical philosopher of his
age, a diagram became the essential expression of what he had
accomplished with his explanation of celestial motions in his
Philosophiæ Naturalis Principia Mathematica (1687).
Scientists and mathematicians diagram a vast array of objects,
relationships, and processes. Cosmological images are among the
oldest diagrams outlining competing interpretations of the
natural world. Many examples survive from the Middle Ages,
suggesting their even greater antiquity. A diagram may depict a
two-dimensional object—a Euclidean diagram of an equilateral
triangle. It can be a two-dimensional projection of a three-
dimensional object—a fossil or a mathematical knot. It can
represent natural processes—the circulation of the blood, the
stratiﬁcation of the earth, the motions of the heavens—of varying
scale and complexity. A diagram may also show relationships,
such as when a phylogeny depicts the genealogical relationships
among different organisms, or when the Swiss linguist Ferdinand
de Saussure famously depicted language as a series of parallel2 David Brewster, The Life of Sir Isaac Newton (London: John Murray, 1831), 324.
This is one of many examples of the use of “diagram” in English found in the Oxford
English Dictionary.
Figure 1. Detail of Isaac Newton’s tomb with diagram of the solar system. From Michael Rysbrack, The Memorial to Sir Isaac Newton, 1731, Westminster Abbey. Copyright Dean
and Chapter of Westminster.
Figure 2. Ferdinand de Saussure’s diagram of the connections between thought
and sound. The horizontal wavy lines labeled A represent the “indeﬁnite plane of
confused ideas,” and those labeled B represent the “equally indeterminate plane of
sounds.” The vertical dotted lines represent a how these two planes are brought into
connection by language. From Cours de Linguistique Générale (Paris: Payot, 1931),
156. Courtesy of the Bibliothèque Nationale de France.
50 G. Priest et al. / Endeavour 42 (2018) 49–59dotted lines connecting thought to sound (Figure 2).3 Or it may
embody a sequence of causally related events, as in the case of a
Feynman diagram of elementary particle interactions.4 Funda-
mentally, a diagram is a mediating object. It expresses our
understanding of how things work by speaking to the eye.
This special issue, the product of an interdisciplinary workshop
organized at Stanford University in 2017, brings together detailed
case studies illustrating a wide variety of diagrammatic practices in
science and mathematics since antiquity. The case studies
presented include: the long evolution of Euclidian diagrams in
the ancient, medieval, and early modern worlds; eleventh-century
Chinese mathematicians who used diagrams as proofs of the
correctness of the algorithms they had created to solve algebraic
equations; a seventeenth-century Sicilian painter who drew
diagrams to visualize missing aspects of fossils disﬁgured by the
ravages of time and circumstance; a nineteenth-century naturalist
who sketched diagrams to explore whether evolutionary processes
could account for observed patterns in living nature; and
contemporary mathematicians who manipulate diagrams to
discover hidden properties of different classes of algebraic objects.3 Ferdinand de Saussure, Cours de Linguistique Générale, 3rd ed. (Paris: Payot,
1931), 156.
4 See David Kaiser, Drawing Theories Apart: The Dispersion of Feynman Diagrams in
Postwar Physics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005).Vast distances—of time, geography, and discipline—separate
the episodes. Yet a deep and subtle connection binds them
together. Each of the case studies examines diagramming—
creating and using diagrams—as an epistemic practice. We
examine diagrams not merely as displays of information, but as
reasoning tools, as objects that are, to quote Reviel Netz in his
study of ancient Greek diagrams, “good to think with.”5 Scientiﬁc
and mathematical diagrams, like mathematical symbolic nota-
tions, can function as constrained representation systems used as
cognitive instruments, allowing users to think with them and so
generate knowledge and understanding. We focus, in short, on
diagrams that function as tools of reason.
Three aspects of diagramming are central to understanding the
use of diagrams as reasoning tools. Although these aspects overlap
and interrelate, considering them separately is helpful in
distinguishing key elements of the function of scientiﬁc diagrams:
 Diagramming is a material practice. Diagrams are generally two-
dimensional inscriptions on a surface, such as a sheet of paper or
a computer screen. This two-dimensional material form under-
lies and informs how they function as tools of reason.
 Diagramming is a dynamic practice. Diagrams can serve as more
than static images from which to extract information. Diagrams
can be mentally manipulated to generate, explore, and test
hypotheses. This manipulability is central to their ability to
generate knowledge.
 Diagramming is a social and cognitive practice. Diagrams are used
by particular communities of practice. They depend upon and
exploit the users’ cognitive capacities and learned competencies.
By reproducing and sharing diagrams, users collectively consti-
tute their own inter-subjective practices of representation that
enable and constrain the use of diagrams as reasoning tools.
We begin our exploration of the use of diagrams as reasoning tools
by brieﬂy situating our approach to this special issue in the context of
other scholarly explorations of scientiﬁc and mathematical diagrams.
Subsequently,weofferabriefaccountofsomeusesofdiagramsinDNA
research to provide a concrete example from which to expand our
discussion of diagrams as tools of reason, and the ways in which the
material, dynamic, and social and cognitive aspects of diagramming
contribute to its function as an epistemic practice. We discuss how5 Reviel Netz, The Shaping of Deduction in Greek Mathematics: A Cognitive History
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 35.
9 James Elkins, The Domain of Images (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001), ix.
10 John V. Kulvicki, On Images (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2006); John V. Kulvicki,
“Knowing with Images: Medium and Message,” Philosophy of Science 77, no. 2 (April
2010): 295–313.
11 Luc Pauwels, ed., Visual Cultures of Science: Rethinking Representational Practices
in Knowledge Building and Science Communication (Hanover: Dartmouth College
Press, 2005), vii.
12 Horst Bredekamp, Vera Dünkel, and Birgit Schneider, eds., The Technical Image: A
History of Styles in Scientiﬁc Imagery (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2015).
13 Marzia Faietti and Gerhard Wolf, eds., The Power of Line (Munich: Hirmer Verlag,
2016).
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particular, scientiﬁc practices involved in diagramming DNA embody
the characteristics of materiality, dynamicity, and embeddedness in a
social and cognitive context that we have identiﬁed as central to the
function of diagrams as reasoning tools, making this famous historical
episode an exemplary case study.
This brief meditation on diagramming DNA is a jumping off point
forthebroaderthemesof thespecial issue. Itsetsthestagefortheother
contributions. Each of them illuminates a range of diagrammatic
practices, past and present, and helps us to better understand the role
of diagrams as tools of reason. We focus especially on how each
contribution contributes to the three essential features described
above regarding the material, dynamic, and social and cognitive
aspects of diagramming scientiﬁc and mathematical concepts.
Diagrams as Things, Diagramming as a Practice
Scientiﬁcandmathematicaldiagramsaremultifarious.Theydeﬁne
avast landscape of knowledge and visual expression in many different
cultures. No single discipline can lay claim to the diagram. As a result,
they have been viewed through more than one disciplinary lens—
especially art history and the more interdisciplinary ﬁeld of visual
studies, historyand philosophyof science, and the cognitive sciences—
and inspired different theoretical constructs devised to analyze them.
It isnotourpurposetoreviewtheliteraturehere,butwecanofferafew
signposts that may assist the reader in navigating the landscape
mapped by the contributions to this special issue.
Historians and philosophers of science have a longstanding interest
in diagrams that has developed as part of a broader study of the
relations between art and science. Brian Baigrie’s edited volume on
Picturing Knowledge (1996), Peter Galison and Caroline Jones’s
Picturing Science, Producing Art (1998), followed by David Kaiser’s
Drawing Theories Apart (2005), and Galison’s coauthored study with
LorraineDaston,Objectivity (2007)havehelped tostimulate interest
in diagrams from this perspective.6 More than two decades of
scholarship have made it increasingly clear how frequently natural
philosophers, mathematicians, and physicians rethought the demon-
strative power of images and vociferously debated with each other
whether an image met the criteria of a “diagram.” For some articulate
proponents of this concept, such as the German astronomer Johannes
Kepler, diagrammata meant geometric proof—which he contrasted
to pictures, ﬁgures, or even hieroglyphs, all of them performing
other visual functions that he found far less compelling.7 Diagrams
are notonlygoodtothink with but also haveepistemic power whose
force and clarity is nonetheless mitigated by the heterogeneous
landscape of visual practices—much vaster than Kepler’s efforts to
restrict the deﬁnition to his standards of proof—that constitute
what diagramming means and does for scientists.
The emergence of this subject in the history and philosophy of
science is deeply indebted to the discipline of art history, beginning
with the pioneering work of ﬁgures such as Martin Kemp, whose
research on Leonardo da Vinci has been a jumping off point for his
broadermeditationsonthevisual cultureofknowledge.8Mostgeneral6 Brian S. Baigrie, ed., Picturing Knowledge: Historical and Philosophical Problems
Concerning the Use of Art in Science (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1996);
Peter Galison and Caroline A. Jones, eds., Picturing Science, Producing Art (New York:
Routledge, 1998); Kaiser, Drawing Theories Apart (ref. 4); Lorraine Daston and Peter
Galison, Objectivity (New York: Zone, 2007).
7 See Christoph Luthy and Alexis Smets, “Words, Lines, Diagrams, Images:
Towards a History of Scientiﬁc Imagery,” Early Science and Medicine 14 (2009): 398–
439, esp. 434.
8 See most recently Martin Kemp, Structural Intuitions: Seeing Shapes in Art and
Science (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2016), and his essays from
Nature collected in Visualizations: The Nature Book of Art and Science (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2010).analyses of scientiﬁc diagrams have emerged from studies of visual
representation. James Elkins’s The Domain of Images (1999) is seminal
in the study of visual representations. Elkins described his subject as
“the domain of visual artifacts,” observing that art historians had
previously concentrated almost exclusively on ﬁne art. He encour-
aged an expanded focus on the vast array of visual images beyond
that limited sphere.9 Similarly, studies of images from a philosoph-
ical perspective, such as John Kulvicki’s On Images (2006), have
considered different kinds of images, including scientiﬁc ones.10
The visual turn in art history ultimately inspired more interdisci-
plinary work invisual studies, forexample, Luc Pauwel’s edited volume
Visual Cultures of Science (2005), with an introduction on “The Role of
Visual Representation in the Production of Scientiﬁc Reality.”11 Not
many years later, a Stanford literary scholar and an art historian,
John Bender and Michael Marrinan, completed their foundational
interdisciplinary study, The Culture of Diagram (2010). More
recently, Horst Bredekamp’s interdisciplinary research group
completed a collaborative project on The Technical Image: A History
of Styles in Scientiﬁc Imagery (2015).12We mighteven consider Marzia
Faietti and Gerhard Wolf’s recent edited volume on The Power of Line
(2016) as an example of the ways in which diagrammatic practices
can become part of a study of artistic technique and geometric
forms.13 All of these publications treat diagrams as a particular kind of
visual representation. This visual orientation to diagramming has been
enormously fruitful. However else they may be conceived, diagrams
must be analyzed as images. Anyone working on scientiﬁc diagrams
today is indebted to this important work on visual representation.
This considerable body of work has taken its place next to parallel
literatures emerging primarily from two different contexts. The ﬁrst
is the interdisciplinary work in philosophy and cognitive sciences
that has resulted in publications such as Alan Blackwell’s edited
volume on Thinking with Diagrams.14 This literature is closely
connected to work on logic, artiﬁcial intelligence, and computer
science. The second, also interdisciplinary, is focused on the use of
diagrams to display complex information in ways accessible to non-
technical audiences. Founded by three pioneering books by Edward
Tufte,15 this ﬁeld has received increasing attention as diagrams
migrate from the technical realm to major news outlets such as the
New York Times as part of new experiments in communicating
knowledge to broader publics in the form of complex visual-
izations.16 These two instances of the visual turn have stimulated14 Alan F. Blackwell, ed., Thinking with Diagrams (Dordrecht: Springer, 2001). For
an analysis of diagrams from the perspective of formal logic, see Sun-Joo Shin, The
Logical Status of Diagrams (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994); and Sun-
Joo Shin, The Iconic Logic of Peirce’s Graphs (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2002).
15 Edward R. Tufte, The Visual Display of Quantitative Information (Cheshire:
Graphics Press, 1983); Envisioning Information (Cheshire: Graphics Press, 1990); and
Visual Explanations: Images and Quantities, Evidence and Narrative (Cheshire:
Graphics Press, 1997).
16 For two particularly effective examples of the power of such infographics, see
Emily Badger, Clair Cain Miller, Adam Pearce, and Kevin Quealy, “Extensive Data
Shows Punishing Reach of Racism for Black Boys,” The New York Times, March 19,
2018, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/03/19/upshot/race-class-white-
and-black-men.html; and Nadja Popovich, Henry Fountain, and Adam Pearce, “We
Charted Arctic Sea Ice for Nearly Every Day Since 1979. You’ll See a Trend,” The New
York Times, September 22, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/09/22/
climate/arctic-sea-ice-shrinking-trend-watch.html.
52 G. Priest et al. / Endeavour 42 (2018) 49–59great interest in human cognition and diagrammatic practices that
ultimately ﬁelds such as history and philosophy of sciences and
visual studies will want to account for.
In this special issue, however, we approach diagrams from a
different orientation. Following a suggestion by Bender and
Marrinan, we agree that it is productive to consider diagrams as
“closer to being things than to being representations of things.”17
We consider diagrams as objects that exist in the world, in
preference to seeing them as visual representations of aspects of
the world. As Tim Ingold observes in his fascinating interdisciplin-
ary history of lines, “human beings generate lines wherever they
go.”18 But if diagrams are things in the world, what kinds of things
are they? They are concrete expressions of thought that facilitate
comprehension and stimulate new patterns of thought. They are
tools of reason.
Tools need to be understood by examining how and where they
are used. We can learn many things about a lathe by examining it as
it sits motionless on a workbench, but watching a lathe being used
by an expert woodworker immeasurably enriches our understand-
ing of the tool. The same principle applies to reasoning tools. We
need to put them in their context to fully comprehend what they
can do.
The contributions to this special issue therefore present
detailed case studies of how diagramming functions in the context
of particular scientiﬁc and mathematical practices. Following the
example of other researchers who have attended closely to
scientiﬁc practice, the contributors to this special issue have
determined “to pay attention to scientiﬁc practices in meticulous
detail and along multiple dimensions, including the material, tacit,
and psycho-social ones.” A focus on practice reduces the risk of an
approach to science that is “too idealized and too disconnected
from how science actually is performed in laboratories and other
research settings.”19 It grounds our historical and philosophical
understanding of diagrams as things in the world.
Similar considerations have motivated an increasing focus on
practice in the history and philosophy of mathematics.20 The
central idea animating this movement is that mathematics, the
most idealized and seemingly disembodied expression of thought,
should be considered also as a human activity with a particular
history rather than exclusively as a domain of eternal truths. The
attention to mathematical practices has also led scholars to pursue
detailed case studies and to attend as much to mathematicians in
the act of conjecturing or discovering as they do to mathematicians
in the act of proving theorems. Diagrams have proven to be a topic
of special focus among scholars concerned with mathematical
practices from antiquity to the present.21 These discipline-speciﬁc
developments need to be considered in relation to a growing17 Bender and Marrinan, The Culture of Diagram (ref. 1), 21.
18 Tim Ingold, Lines: A Brief History (London: Routledge, 2007), 1.
19 Léna Soler, Sjoerd Zwart, Michael Lynch, and Vincent Israel-Jost, “Introduction”,
in Science After the Practice Turn in the Philosophy, History, and Social Studies of
Science, ed. Léna Soler, Sjoerd Zwart, Michael Lynch, and Vincent Israel-Jost, 1–43
(New York: Routledge, 2014), on 1.
20 A seminal publication in this tradition is Paolo Mancosu, ed., The Philosophy of
Mathematical Practice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).
21 The ﬁrst four chapters of Mancosu, ed., The Philosophy of Mathematical Practice
(ref. 20) are dedicated to the study of mathematical diagrams. These include a
specialist article by Marcus Giaquinto, which addresses issues of visual cognition
and the famous “The Euclidean Diagram (1995)” by Kenneth Manders, which
circulated widely as a manuscript before being published; the other two are more
introductory contributions by the same authors. See also Marcus Giaquinto, Visual
Thinking in Mathematics: An Epistemological Study (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2007); and for a survey see Marcus Giaquinto, “The Epistemology of Visual Thinking
in Mathematics,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2016 Edition), ed.
Edward N. Zalta, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/epistemolo-
gy-visual-thinking/.interest in the use of diagrams in ﬁelds such as medicine, natural
history, astronomy, optics, physics, and engineering.
A special issue alone cannot claim to cover all these subjects; we
have instead offered a diverse array of detailed case studies of
diagrammatic practices, hoping that they will stimulate further
work by other scholars. They do not aim at giving a general account
of diagramming—which would inevitably be highly idealized—but
seek to understand how diagramming functions in particular
scenarios that deﬁne the reasons, the practices, and the possibili-
ties of this kind of scientiﬁc visualization.
Diagramming DNA: “A Jumble of Words and Diagrams”
In this section, we offer an abbreviated account of uses of
diagramming in two areas of DNA research—the determination of
the double helical structure of DNA and the use of DNA topology to
analyze DNA function.
The Discovery of the Double Helix
Although most accounts of James Watson and Francis Crick’s
work on the structure of DNA, which led to the discovery of its
double-helix structure in 1953, focus on their investigations using
three-dimensional models, diagramming was also central to their
practice.22 The blackboard in Crick’s ofﬁce at Cambridge was,
according to his biographer Matt Ridley, “the focus of most
discussions, accumulating a jumble of words and diagrams.” The
blackboard “continually changed its appearance, as many times
during the day as new theories, speculations, and facts emerged.”23
When the collaborators were not in Crick’s ofﬁce, they would make
do with whatever was to hand. Crick scribbled diagrams on the
blank back page of a manuscript he had been reading to explain to
Watson how they might account for some of Rosalind Franklin’s X-
ray crystallography ﬁndings.24 They communicated with each
other and ultimately with a much broader public by diagramming.
By January 1953, Watson and Crick still had not reached a
conclusion about DNA’s structure. They knew that Linus Pauling
was also working on the problem and were therefore initially
devastated when they were shown a preprint in which Pauling and
his collaborator Robert Corey proposed that DNA was structured as
three helices spiraling off from a center sugar-phosphate
backbone.25 Watson and Crick greedily pored over the paper.
After “less than a minute” reading the written summary and
introduction, Watson turned to the diagrams in the manuscript,
one of which is shown here as Figure 3. Studying them for several
minutes led him to belief that Pauling and Corey’s proposed
structure could not possibly be right.2622 Although we have focused this account on the diagrammatic practices of
Watson and Crick, we are well aware that many others contributed substantially to
the discovery that DNA is structured as a double helix. Rosalind Franklin’s X-ray
crystallography studies were also central to the discovery, for only one example.
See, for instance, Lynne Osman Elkin, “Rosalind Franklin and the Double Helix,”
Physics Today 56, no. 3 (2003): 42–48.
23 Matt Ridley, Francis Crick: Discoverer of the Genetic Code (New York: Harper
Perennial, 2009), 102.
24 James D. Watson, The Double Helix: A Personal Account of the Discovery of the
Structure of DNA (New York: Touchstone; 2001), 77. A number of Crick’s early DNA
diagrams can be viewed in the Francis Crick papers, held at the Wellcome Library in
London. Some of this material has been digitized and is available online. Several
DNA diagrams can be seen at “The Francis Crick Papers: Notes and Drafts/Notes and
Drafts 1950–1955/“DNA”,” accessed March 17, 2018, https://proﬁles.nlm.nih.gov/
ps/retrieve/Series/10382.
25 The paper was eventually published as Linus Pauling and Robert B. Corey, “A
Proposed Structure for the Nucleic Acids,” Proceedings of the National Academy of
Sciences 39, no. 2 (1953): 84–97.
26 Watson, The Double Helix (ref. 24), 160.
Figure 4. Francis Crick’s preliminary DNA diagram, prepared for Odile Crick’s use in
creating the diagram for inclusion in the Nature paper announcing the discovery of
the double helix. This image comes from Wellcome Images, a website operated by
Wellcome Trust, a global charitable foundation based in the United Kingdom.
Figure 3. Linus Pauling’s and Robert Corey’s diagram of their hypothesized
structure of DNA, with three helices spiraling off from a central sugar-phosphate
backbone. From “A Proposed Structure for the Nucleic Acids,” Proceedings of the
National Academy of Sciences 39, no. 2 (1953): 84–97, on 92. From the Ava Helen and
Linus Pauling Papers, OSU Libraries Special Collections & Archives Research Center.
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and resume their search for the correct structure, Watson and Crick
redoubled their own efforts. They soon made an important
breakthrough, leading them to conclude that DNA was structured
as a double helix surrounding a sugar-phosphate backbone. They
announced their ﬁndings publicly in the April 1953 issue of the journal
Nature, opening this important paper by summarizing the problems
with the Pauling and Corey (and another similar) structure. Watson
and Crick then boldly proclaimed: “We wish to put forward a
radically different structure for the salt of deoxyribose nucleic acid.
This structure has two helical chains each coiled around the same
axis (see diagram).”27 This simple phrase invited readers to look at
an image that precisely captured what they described in contrast to
Pauling and Corey’s diagram. It subsequently became one of the
most iconic scientiﬁc diagrams of any age.
As soon as Watson and Crick started preparing their publication
to announce their discovery, they realized that a diagram depicting
the structure was essential to convey their proposal. Neither
scientist was a gifted draughtsman, but Crick’s wife Odile Crick was
an artist (although she painted mostly nudes). They asked her to
draw the diagram, and she agreed. Francis drew a preliminary
diagram for Odile to work from (Figure 4).28
The diagram Odile created for publication became the
conceptual and rhetorical center of the paper.29 Her transforma-
tion of her husband’s sketch is shown in Figure 5.
The caption to the diagram reads: “The ﬁgure is purely
diagrammatic. The two ribbons symbolize the two phosphate-
sugar chains, and the horizontal rods the pairs of bases holding the
chains together. The vertical line marks the ﬁbre axis.”
What did it mean to be “purely diagrammatic” when representing
DNA? The horizontal bars represent hydrogen bonds between pairs of
bases, adenine always binding to thymine and cytosine always binding
to guanine. As Watson and Crick noted, the diagram thus explains the27 John D. Watson and Francis H. C. Crick, “A Structure for Deoxyribose Nucleic
Acid,” Nature 171 (April 25, 1953): 737–38, on 737.
28 Box number 69, Folder number PP/CRI/H/1/16, Identiﬁer: SCBBWB, Francis
Harry Compton Crick Papers, Wellcome Library for the History and Understanding
of Medicine.
29 Watson and Crick, “A Structure for Deoxyribose Nucleic Acid” (ref. 27), 737.otherwise puzzling and previously unexplained observation that DNA
always contains the same quantities of adenine and thymine, and of
guanine and cytosine. The diagram also includes two arrows showing
thatonehelixspiralsupandtotheright,andtheotherspiralsdownand
to the left. Thus, “it follows that if the sequence of bases on one chain is
given, then the sequence on the other chain is automatically
determined.” This, as the authors coyly observed, “immediately
suggests a possible copying mechanism for the genetic material.”30
Watson and Crick clearly considered the Nature diagram to be of
great heuristic value. At the ﬁrst public presentation of the
discovery of the structure of DNA at a 1953 symposium at the Cold
Spring Harbor Laboratory, Watson used the diagram to explicate
the structure (see Figure 6). They included its exact facsimile in
both of their other 1953 papers on DNA.31 Through replication, this30 Watson and Crick, “A Structure for Deoxyribose Nucleic Acid” (ref. 27), 737.
31 James D. Watson and Francis H. C. Crick, “Genetical Implications of the Structure
of Deoxyribonucleic Acid,” Nature 171 (May 30, 1953): 964–67, on 965; “The
Structure of DNA,” Cold Spring Harbor Symposia on Quantitative Biology 18 (1953):
123–31, on 125.
54 G. Priest et al. / Endeavour 42 (2018) 49–59singular experiment in how to get an image of a structure right
eventually became the diagram of DNA.
Today we are so seduced by the beauty, simplicity, and
explanatory power of Watson and Crick’s proposed structure that
it comes as a surprise to learn that the initial response to their
proposal was, as Robert Olby has put it, “lukewarm.”32 One reason
was that most DNA researchers were biochemists and physical
chemists whose funding and institutional afﬁliations were chieﬂy
medical. The primary interests of these scientists and their funders
were the sources of DNA mutations and the details of protein
synthesis.33 It was not until some years later that it became clear
that the questions Watson and Crick were asking were even
relevant to those concerns.
More substantive was the “unwinding problem”: how does a
long molecule with a double helical structure unwind so that the
individual strands can be copied? Watson and Crick understood
that “the difﬁculty is a topological one,”34 but they had not
developed the mathematical expertise that would have allowed
them even to approach it seriously. They could only acknowledge
that the problem was “formidable.”35 Watson and Crick lamented
that “it is difﬁcult at the moment to see how these processes occur
without everything getting tangled.”36 They had yet to solve a
problem that both their explanation and their diagram raised.
DNA Topology
For some years thereafter, little fundamental progress was
made on the unwinding problem. Although electron microscopy
and X-ray crystallography enabled further advances on DNA
structure, the processing of DNA required for such techniques to be
used meant that they were able to provide little direct evidence for
the shape of long chains of DNA in vivo.37
In 1962, at a meeting at which biologists were asked to present
on new problems that might lend themselves to mathematization,
Max Delbrück proposed that the knotting and entanglement of
long chain organic molecules, including nucleic acids, were a good
candidate. He offered his ideas “with considerable difﬁdence,
feeling very uncertain whether the mathematical idealizations we
introduce are physically appropriate and mathematically elegant,
or even consistent.”38 Since then, scientists have continued down
the path Delbrück mapped by developing topological techniques
and applying them to these questions, thus giving rise to the ﬁeld
of DNA topology.39
One branch of topology that has been particularly fruitful in this
respect is knot theory.40 Watson and Crick’s double helix model
can be approximated by a single string going through the axis of a
double helix. This simpliﬁcation allows us to model DNA as a string
that can form physical knots. Knot theory allows us to study theFigure 5. DNA diagram from James Watson’s and Francis Crick’s Nature paper
announcing the discovery of the double helix. The two ribbons spiraling in opposite
directions depict the sugar-phosphate chains, the horizontal lines depict the
complementary base pairs joining the chains together, and the vertical line depicts
the ﬁber backbone. Reprinted by permission from Macmillan Publishers Ltd: Nature
(James D. Watson and Francis H. C. Crick, “A Structure for Deoxyribose Nucleic Acid,”
Nature 171 (April 25, 1953): 737–38, at 737), copyright 1953. Image courtesy of the
Department of Special Collections, Stanford University Library.
32 Robert Olby, “Quiet Debut for the Double Helix,” Nature 421 (January 23, 2003):
402–5, on 402.
33 Olby, “Quiet Debut” (ref. 32), 402.
34 Watson and Crick, “The Structure of DNA” (ref. 31), 128.
35 Watson and Crick, “The Structure of DNA” (ref. 31), 129.
36 Watson and Crick, “Genetical Implications” (ref. 31), 966.
37 De Witt Sumners, “Lifting the Curtain: Using Topology to Probe the Hidden
Action of Enzymes,” Notices of the American Mathematical Society 42, no. 5 (1995):
528–37, on 528.
38 Max Delbrück, “Knotting Problems in Biology,” Proceedings of Symposia in
Applied Mathematics 14 (1962): 55–63, on 55.
39 See, for example, Andrew D. Bates and Anthony Maxwell, DNA Topology (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2005); Steven A. Wasserman and Nicholas R. Cozzarelli,
“Biochemical Topology: Applications to DNA Recombination and Replication,”
Science 232 (1986): 951–60; Sumners, “Lifting the Curtain” (ref. 37); and Dorothy
Buck and Erica Flapan, “A Topological Characterization of Knots and Links Arising
from Site-speciﬁc Recombination,” Journal of Physics A: Mathematical and Theoretical
40 (2007): 12377–395.
40 See Sumners, “Lifting the Curtain” (ref. 37).
Figure 6. James Watson using the diagram from his and Francis Crick’s Nature paper to explicate the structure of DNA at the ﬁrst public presentation of Watson’s and Crick’s
proposed structure at a 1953 symposium at the Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory. Courtesy of the Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory Archives.
G. Priest et al. / Endeavour 42 (2018) 49–59 55properties of physical knots by abstracting them into mathematical
knots, smooth closed simple curves embedded in three-dimen-
sional space. The speciﬁc geometric shape of a knot is not relevant
for the knot theorist; only the way it is knotted is mathematically
relevant. Any two knots are of the same mathematical type if one
can be turned into the other by continuously deforming it, without
cutting it and re-gluing the ends. Knot theorists can investigate the
properties of mathematical knots using knot diagrams, two-
dimensional projections of knots. As two-dimensional inscriptions,
knot diagrams are easier to work with than three-dimensional
knots, and, if manipulated according to rigorously deﬁned rules,
can generate valid mathematical results about the knots they
represent.4141 A fundamental theorem of knot theory—the Reidemeister theorem—holds that
all diagrams representing the same knot can be shown to be equivalent by
performing a series of three local moves: the Reideimeister moves. See Colin C.
Adams, The Knot Book (New York: W. H. Freemand and Company, 1994), for an
accessible introduction to knot theory.To understand the application of knot theory to DNA structure,
consider Figure 7.42 Figure 7a shows a picture of a physical knot of
DNA taken using an electron microscope. Figure 7b–d render the
knot diagrammatically, progressively showing how, by manipulat-
ing the knot’s diagram, we can see that the apparently complicated
physical knot is actually a mathematically simple trefoil knot. Thus,
knot diagrams allow us to see properties of physical DNA knots that
might not be apparent from, or might even be obscured by,
photographic representations. By drawing a corresponding dia-
gram, we simplify the representation by depicting only what is
mathematically relevant.43
The simpliﬁcation performed by the diagram may be helpful to
researchers in many ways. A complex shape that appears
thoroughly entangled in a photograph might turn out not to be42 Wasserman and Cozzarelli, “Biochemical Topology” (ref. 39), 952.
43 See Silvia De Toffoli and Valeria Giardino, “Forms and Roles of Diagrams in Knot
Theory,” Erkenntnis 79, no. 4 (2014): 829–42, for an epistemological analysis of knot
diagrams.
Figure 7. Electron micrograph of knotted strand of DNA (a) and three progressively simpliﬁed knot diagrams of the knotted strand of DNA (b and c), culminating in a ﬁnal
diagram (d) showing that the strand of DNA can be represented by a simple trefoil knot. From Steven A. Wasserman and Nicholas R. Cozzarelli, “Biochemical Topology:
Applications to DNA Recombination and Replication,” Science 232 (1986): 951–60, 952. Reprinted with permission from AAAS.
45 Models in science and mathematics take many forms (only some of which are
physical), and the literature analyzing how they feature in scientiﬁc and
mathematical practice is extensive. See, for example, Roman Frigg and Stephan
Hartmann, “Models in Science,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer
2018 Edition), ed. Edward N. Zalta, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/models-
science/; Michael Weisberg, Simulation and Similarity: Using Models to Understand
56 G. Priest et al. / Endeavour 42 (2018) 49–59knotted at all, or to be knotted in a much simpler way than ﬁrst
appears. This also enables researchers to gain a better purchase on
what kinds of topological deformations a strand of DNA might
undergo. More generally, it has been claimed that “[t]opology
affects virtually every nucleic acid process that requires the
double helix to be opened or moved within the cell” and that
“[t]opoisomerases, the enzymes that regulate the topological
structure of DNA, play critical roles in fundamental cellular
processes, including replication, transcription, recombination, and
mitosis.”44 Thus, diagramming DNA encouraged new ways of
thinking about a broad array of genetic structures with the
assistance of mathematical reasoning.
What Kind of Tool Is a DNA Diagram?
The foregoing excursus on the history of DNA research
provides us with a concrete foundation from which we can
begin to explore the attributes that diagrams used as reasoning
tools tend to share, which we brieﬂy identiﬁed at the beginning of
this introduction.
DNA Diagramming as a Material Practice
Diagrams generally take the form of two-dimensional inscrip-
tions on a surface such as paper or a computer screen. Watson and
Crick’s published diagram of the DNA double helix (Figure 5) is a
two-dimensional projection of a three-dimensional shape. This
material instantiation of the DNA diagram as a two-dimensional
inscription is fundamental.
Watson and Crick also modeled DNA in three dimensions, using
wires and balls (see Figure 8). This technique was helpful in
visualizing aspects of the DNA structure, such as the angles at
which the bases bond and the spatial relations of the bases to the
sugar-phosphate backbone. However, it is much easier to infer the44 Joseph E. Deweese, Michael A. Osheroff, and Neil Osheroff, “DNA Topology and
Topoisomerases: Teaching a ‘Knotty’ Subject,” Biochemistry and Molecular Biology
Education 37, no. 1 (2009): 2–10, on 3 (citations omitted).likely copying mechanism from an examination of the two-
dimensional diagram than from a three-dimensional model.45
On the other hand, Watson and Crick also described funda-
mental aspects of their proposed structure using text. This allowed
them to provide the reader with a great deal of detail on bonding
distances and angles not represented in the diagram. Nonetheless,
the two-dimensional diagram offers a more immediate sense of a
synoptic understanding of the structure. This contribution of the
diagram to an understanding of the basics of DNA’s structure is
evidenced by Watson using it in his initial presentation of the
structure at the symposium held at the Cold Spring Harbor
Laboratory (see Figure 6) and Watson and Crick’s inclusion of the
original Nature diagram in so many of their subsequent papers.
Knot diagrams, too, are two-dimensional material inscriptions
representing three-dimensional knots. Although knot diagrams
can also be represented by a sequence of numbers,46 it is thanks to
their two-dimensional layout that we can immediately visualize
them as curves in space. Moreover, their two-dimensionality
enables us to perform manipulations which, as illustrated in Figure
7, allow us to visualize how a tangled, three-dimensional strand of
DNA can be seen as an instance of a simple trefoil knot. These
manipulations on knot diagrams (the Reidemeister moves and
their combinations) are easily interpreted as corresponding to
manipulations of a string in three-dimensional space but at the
same time correspond to rigorous mathematical operations.the World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013); and Ronald Giere, “An Agent-
Based Conception of Models and Scientiﬁc Representation,” Synthese 172, no. 2
(2010): 269–81. For a discussion of the special characteristics and functions of
three-dimensional models, see Soraya de Chadarevian and Nick Hopwood, eds.,
Models: The Third Dimension in Science (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004).
46 For example, knot diagrams can be “coded” with the Dowker notation. See
Adams, The Knot Book (ref. 41), chapter 2.
Figure 8. Watson and Crick’s original three-dimensional demonstration model of
the structure of DNA. Courtesy of the Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory Archives.
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Some visual representations are static displays of information:
we derive information from them by reading it off of them. Such
static displays can be useful devices for quick storage and retrieval
of information, but our primary interest in this special issue is in
diagrams that users interact with dynamically. Silvia De Toffoli and
Valeria Giardino have proposed the term “manipulative imagina-
tion” to capture how users of knot diagrams mentally work with,
reshape, and otherwise transform diagrams in order to answer
questions and explore hypotheses.47 Their idea that one can gain
knowledge from a diagram by performing manipulations on it
applies as well to a variety of other diagrams.
In the case of knot diagrams, as well as diagrams used in other
mathematical domains, these manipulations take the form of
rigorously deﬁned operations leading to veriﬁably valid results.48
In other areas, including many of the sciences, diagrammatic
manipulations may not follow strict rules or generate results that
can be conclusively validated, but they nonetheless support the
development and testing of hypotheses about phenomena, as well
as understanding of the operation of processes and mechanisms.47 De Toffoli and Giardino, “Forms and Roles of Diagrams” (ref. 43).
48 Regarding the speciﬁc operations that are allowed on knot diagrams, see De
Toffoli and Giardino, “Forms and Roles of Diagrams” (ref. 43). Regarding the speciﬁc
operations used on commutative diagrams in homological algebra, see Silvia De
Toffoli, “‘Chasing’ the Diagram—The Use of Visualizations in Algebraic Reasoning,”
The Review of Symbolic Logic 10, no. 1 (2017): 158–86.We understand, for example, the mechanism by which Watson
and Crick suggested that DNA might be copied through an act of
manipulative imagination. Recall that the diagram from the Nature
paper (Figure 5) includes arrows showing one helix coiling up and
to the right and its complementary helix coiling down and to the
left. These arrows encourage us to see beyond the literal image,
forming a mental picture of the actions that will be performed. We
imagine the two complementary strands of DNA unzipping. We
then imagine each base in the resulting separate strands bonding
with its complementary base, and we end with two complete
strands of DNA identical with the one original strand. The diagram
stimulates this subsequent portrait of nature in action.
Similar considerations apply in DNA topology. To realize that
the physical strand of DNA (Figure 7a) can be represented by a
simple trefoil knot diagram, we imagine the knot undergoing a
series of transformations, aided by the sequence of diagrams
(Figure 7b–d).
DNA Diagramming as a Social and Cognitive Practice
In order to make sense of actual scientiﬁc and mathematical
practices, scientists and mathematicians are best understood not
as disembodied reasoning machines, but as human actors
participating in a communal and cognitive enterprise. This is
relevant to the use of diagrams as tools in at least two respects.
First, diagrams must be understood as they are used in a particular
community of practice that is historically situated. Second, the
people making up that community share learned competencies
that tools of reason must take into account in order to speak to
their intended audience. In other words, diagramming is a learned
language.49
The two-dimensional material form of diagrams makes them
particularly well suited for the communal production of knowl-
edge. A diagram is usually easily reproduced and shared, formally
and informally. A diagram can be scribbled on a piece of scrap
paper in conversation, depicted on a slide during a lecture or
conference presentation, shared publicly on the web, or published
in a scientiﬁc article. Thus shared, the diagram becomes an inter-
subjective tool that can be used by different members of a
community, simultaneously and asynchronously, locally and
remotely, thus ultimately transcending the original community
of practice in which it emerged.
The case of the double helix diagram nicely illustrates the ease
with which diagrams can be shared and reproduced, fostering their
utility as reasoning tools. The blackboard in Crick’s ofﬁce operated
as a communal space for discussion by way of diagrams for an
intimate scientiﬁc community. Watson and Crick used both
diagrams and three-dimensional models in their own investiga-
tions of DNA, yet they could easily share their diagrams with other
researchers through conference presentations and publications. In
contrast, their three-dimensional models sat in their ofﬁces at
Cambridge. Beyond the famous photograph shown in Figure 8
(which in any case, was not ﬁrst published until much later), the
model could not circulate to the same degree as the diagram.
A community of practice can, of course, be a hindrance to the
acceptance or development of an idea as much as it can be a
blessing. Consider the initially tepid reception of Watson and
Crick’s announcement of the double helix. There were, to be sure,
theoretical concerns with their proposed structure, not least, the
“unwinding problem.” But the institutional and ﬁnancial context of49 Both interpretation and rules for correct use of diagrams are generally learned
in a speciﬁc institutional context. In De Toffoli and Giardino, “Forms and Roles of
Diagrams” (ref. 43), the authors write of “enhanced” manipulative imagination to
stress the point that manipulative imagination is enhanced by training.
58 G. Priest et al. / Endeavour 42 (2018) 49–59the relevant community of practice was also critical. The primarily
medical focus of that community militated against a serious
engagement with Watson and Crick’s proposal at the time they
made it because it did not seem directly relevant to the
community’s work or to the objectives of their funders. Put a
different way, the diagram was not legible by these criteria.
The development of the ﬁeld of DNA topology is a particularly
ﬁne example of the importance of the cognitive aspect of
diagrammatic practice. Few biologists in 1953 had even the most
rudimentary understanding of mathematical topology. Crick and
Delbrück had both begun their careers studying highly mathemat-
ical areas of physics,50 which may explain Crick’s intuition that the
unwinding problem was topological and Delbrück’s suggestion
that mathematical approaches to knots might be fruitful for the
study of nucleic acid tangling. In order for DNA topology even to
become viable as an area of study, scientists had to develop learned
competencies in biochemistry and knot theory. Moreover, a
sufﬁciently well-formed community had to develop that funding
could be acquired, publications could be vetted, and junior
researchers could be trained.
This excursus on diagramming DNA highlights the material,
dynamic, and social and cognitive aspects of diagrammatic
practices in the area of DNA research. They are all epistemic
practices that make DNA diagrams powerful tools of reason. DNA
diagrams have been and are being used not merely to represent
knowledge, but as aids to generate knowledge. DNA researchers
think—generating, testing, and sometimes even establishing the
validity of hypotheses—by diagramming.
Conclusion
Diagramming is a central element of scientiﬁc and mathemati-
cal practice in a broad range of ﬁelds. Like any practice,
diagramming is best understood by a careful investigation of its
actual use in particular historical circumstances, and that is the
method that the contributions to this special issue have employed.
Yet, through their insights into the material, dynamic, and social
and cognitive aspects of diagrams, they also lead us to certain
general conclusions about how diagrams work in science and
mathematics.
Of course, these preliminary observations about diagramming
as an epistemic practice leave a great many questions about the use
of diagrams in the setting of any particular practice still
unanswered. The authors of the papers in this special issue use
their case studies to ask some of these questions and to sketch the
outlines of possible answers. They include: What does a particular
diagram make visible, and what does it omit or obscure? Who is
the intended audience? What happens when a diagram is used in
ways that differ from the ones for which it was originally intended?
Does the meaning of a diagram change when its use changes? How
are diagrams affected by—and how do they in turn affect—the
scientiﬁc and cultural contexts in which they are created and
deployed? What makes a diagram effective as a reasoning tool?
What makes a diagram ineffective, or even misleading? If diagrams
generate knowledge, could the same knowledge be generated
using a different modality? If so, what purpose is served by the use
of diagrams?50 Crick had started his PhD in physics with a supervisor who studied the
mathematics of ﬂow, viscosity and creep. Ridley, Francis Crick (ref. 23), 10–11.
Delbrück earned his PhD in theoretical physics and did post-doctoral research on
quantum mechanics with Niels Bohr and Wolfgang Pauli. “Max Delbrück—
Biographical,” in Nobel Lectures, Physiology or Medicine (Amsterdam: Elsevier
Publishing Company, 1972).The eight papers in this special issue engage with the themes of
this special issue. The ﬁrst three essays deal with the evolution of
diagrammatic practices between antiquity and the seventeenth
century. Karine Chemla examines how an eleventh-century
mathematical diagram interacts with the surrounding text and
concludes that the diagram proves the validity of the algorithmic
solution to the algebraic problem to which the diagram
corresponds. She focuses in particular on how material aspects
of the diagram, including its use of color and the placement of
captions affects the diagram’s use and meaning. Eunsoo Lee traces
the evolution of editions of Euclid’s Elements across a shift from a
manuscript culture in which diagrams were visual auxiliaries in a
text-centered presentation to a print culture in which diagram-
ming emerged as a visual language. New readers with more
practical needs for using diagrams were recruited for the Elements,
and those readers were encouraged to construct the diagrams as
they read. Paula Findlen studies how the seventeenth-century
painter and naturalist Agostino Scilla used dotted lines and other
diagrammatic techniques to develop and express visual hypothe-
ses about the morphology of the living organisms whose fossil
remains he painstakingly reconstructed. She also explores how
Scilla collaborated with the engraver and draftsman Pietro Santi
Bartoli to render his drawings into engravings for publication.
The second cluster of essays illuminates nineteenth-century
diagrammatic practices in cosmology, engineering, and natural
history. Jennifer Daly shows how the Romantic astronomer John
Pringle Nichol and the artists and engravers David Scott and
William Bell Scott worked together to create diagrammatic and
pictorial representations embodying an unresolved tension
between an ambition to convey knowledge extending beyond
the realm of human perception and a recognition of humans’
inevitably partial and imperfect epistemic purchase on the world.
Norton Wise recounts how practical engineers around the turn of
the nineteenth century who were concerned with keeping steam
engines running efﬁciently created instruments that inscribed
diagrams that could be read like a medical case report to diagnose
the problem and suggest remedies. He then shows how later
physicists reinterpreted and reﬁgured those diagrams as tools to
explore general properties of thermodynamic systems. Greg Priest
traces how Charles Darwin used tree diagrams to give visual
expression both to observed patterns in nature and to conjectural
narratives of evolutionary history so that he could investigate the
narratives’ power to explain the patterns. He also explores how
Darwin’s diagrams call for, and reward, imaginative manipulations
in which the reader follows the diagram down a prescribed path,
then mentally rescales the diagram, and ﬁnally entirely reinter-
prets it to refer to new and different entities and phenomena.
The ﬁnal section of the special issue explores the recent
evolution of diagrammatic practices in mathematics. Valeria
Giardino analyzes topological diagrams used by contemporary
mathematicians and Gottlob Frege’s Begriffsschrift (concept nota-
tion), which is a two-dimensional notation for logic, as examples of
“cognitive tools”—human-designed material objects that enable,
and shape, the way we think. She examines how users bring their
manipulative imagination to the diagrams and uses the psycho-
logical concept of “affordances” to analyze diagrams in terms of the
uses they support by human actors with characteristically human
cognitive capacities. Jessica Carter analyzes contemporary mathe-
matical practice, drawing on her interpretation of Charles Sanders
Peirce’s semiotics to suggest that certain diagrams can be
understood as “faithful representations,” because they support
rigorous manipulations that allow them to connect different
domains of mathematical inquiry diagrams. She concludes that
these diagrams can generate “epistemic gains.”
Almost six hundred years ago, Leon Battista Alberti deﬁned the
ideal drawing as “a precise uniform representation conceived in
G. Priest et al. / Endeavour 42 (2018) 49–59 59the mind.”51 Alberti’s pictorial idiom is not necessarily our own; he
innovated practices speciﬁc to the revival of Euclidean thought and
its applications to painting in ﬁfteenth-century Italy that have been
subsequently used and transformed in other contexts.52 Yet he
reminds us that science always makes the diagram. Diagrams do
not make science, but diagram-makers give knowledge concrete
visual expression that, as the case of the double helix reveals, can
allow it to travel and ultimately transcend the original circum-
stances of its production.
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